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Abstract
Establishing unique identities for both humans and end systems has been
an active research problem in the security community, giving rise to inno-
vative machine learning-based authentication techniques. Although such
techniques offer an automated method to establish identity, they have not
been vetted against sophisticated attacks that target their core machine
learning technique. This paper demonstrates that mimicking the unique
signatures generated by host fingerprinting and biometric authentication
systems is possible. We expose the ineffectiveness of underlying machine
learning classification models by constructing a blind attack based around
the query synthesis framework and utilizing Explainable–AI (XAI) tech-
niques. We launch an attack in under 130 queries on a state-of-the-art face
authentication system, and under 100 queries on a host authentication sys-
tem. We examine how these attacks can be defended against and explore
their limitations. XAI provides an effective means for adversaries to infer
decision boundaries and provides a new way forward in constructing attacks
against systems using machine learning models for authentication.
1 Introduction
Authenticating subjects in a system is essential for establishing trust. While authentication
is often performed with traditional credential or user-based mechanisms, machine learning
(ML) is being increasingly used for authentication. By reformulating authentication as a
classification problem, both humans and machines can act as subjects and be authenticated
with high accuracy and minimal false positives [4, 6, 21, 24, 26, 36]. The underlying goal
of these authentication systems is to use unique information owned by the user to attest
a claimed identity. The modality of this information has changed from passphrases and
PIN numbers to fuzzy features such as facial features [6] and end-system behavior (e.g., key
strokes [29], hardware information [7], and device usage [12, 23, 29]).
However, these authentication techniques tend to only consider naive spoofing attacks that
replicate features using domain knowledge, rather than targeting the underlying model’s
decision boundary. The field of adversarial machine learning (AML) has uncovered several
milestone attacks against state-of-the-art ML models [14, 34, 35]. A limitation of these
Pre–print, work in progress.
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Figure 1: Examples of the two XAI-assisted perturbation techniques to fool a biometric
authentication system during our proposed attack. The adversary is able to masquerade
with absolutely no information of the victim, maximum success rate, and minimal queries.
proposed attacks is the context in which they are built; their explicit goal is breaking
classification tasks, rather than authentication tasks. Some of the key differences that
distinguish authentication attacks from recently proposed classification attacks are:
Information returned from the authentication system is limited. In authentica-
tion tasks, class-level information is limited, and feedback from the model is essentially
non-existent, apart from the final authentication decision. Although the underlying model
may be the same, the public interface through which authentication may be performed is
purposefully limited to a binary classification problem. For example, the interface provided
by face authentication services, such as Windows Hello, will only display a fail or success [28].
This is coupled with the fact that the number of queries available to an attacker is limited,
so there is an ever–vanishing window during which the attacker can gather information. We
can consider an authentication system as an oracle that outputs a binary decision based on
a provided username and token pair. An attacker could theoretically extract side-channel
information about a target directly from the oracle [14], but the information returned by a
real-world authentication system (Yes or No) is not sufficient for proposed inversion attacks
to be practical, as such attacks require either confidence information or class predictions [34].
We avoid relying on either of these values as they are likely not available to the user in a
real-world authentication system. Our attack relies entirely on the binary authentication
result returned by the oracle.
Target information is secret and hidden. In previous machine learning attacks, an
adversary may perturb the features of a known target, and force it to be mislabelled. These
are attacks against classification, where an attacker takes correctly-classified input features
and iteratively modifies them with the goal of altering the classification result. In the face
authentication domain, this takes the form of compressing a known target into a less visually
perceptible version of itself so it can bypass a classifier. For example, images of a known
target’s face can be used to construct perturbations that fool the authentication system [41].
This is a consequence of “fuzzy” authentication systems, which rely on mutable properties
to establish identity. In these cases, it is attractive to reconstruct the problem into a
generative modeling problem, where the target must be reconstructed using some additional
information acquired by the adversary. However, in a system which uses physical properties
of the target to authenticate, such as physical runtime characteristics of an end host in
a system authentication task, the adversary needs direct access to the host to gather any
information. Thus, our own attack is motivated to be completely blind. Instead of relying
on any known target information, we leverage explainable AI (XAI) techniques [37] to infer
an oracle’s decision boundaries. XAI techniques, such as LIME [37], are primarily used
for generating human–understandable explanations of a machine learning model’s decision.
However, we find that XAI systems also grant the ability to discover an oracle’s decision
boundary without needing any secret information about potential victims.
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Figure 2: Visual description of attack method. a) The adversary builds a private database of
perturbed feature vectors and their corresponding labels by querying the oracle F through
the authentication stream X. Feature vectors are labelled one authentication stream at a
time. b) With DA built, the adversary trains the LIME model and uses its interpretation
to synthesize a new query. This process repeats until a “Yes” is given.
Contributions. This paper circumvents the previous limitations by formulating an attack
which combines AML, query synthesis, and XAI techniques. To the best of our knowledge,
this attack is the first to use XAI techniques to aid the adversary’s goal of gleaning informa-
tion about the decision boundary. The attack is first formalized to show that it generalizes to
other authentication domains by limiting the number of queries an adversary needs to learn
the model’s decision boundary. The attack is then used against state-of-the-art end-host
and biometric authentication systems. As illustrated in Figure 1, the attack is effective even
in a biometric authentication system where victim signatures are secret. The attack is later
verified against a widely-used black-box face authentication API named Face++ [13]. We
show an adversary can circumvent defended models and achieve 93% success rate with as
few as 100 queries to the Oracle, rivaling recent attacks which relied on top-k class feedback
from the oracle [41].
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides background information on
each domain relevant to our attacks; Section 3 presents our threat model and approach;
Section 4 gives our evaluation results; Section 5 discusses our use of XAI and the limitations
of our approach; Section 6 considers related work; and Section 7 concludes.
2 Background
We focus on attacking authentication systems that use ML models to differentiate between
principals. In this section, we briefly discuss each domain relevant to our attack.
2.1 Fingerprinting for Authentication
Authentication is the act of verifying an identity using a set of unique credentials. Tradi-
tional credential formats include PINs, passwords, and keys. More recent authentication
systems use a combination of traditional credentials and fingerprints (including biometrics).
For example, recent systems are able to deduce fingerprints for smartphone users through
the way they interact with the touchscreen [23]. For computers with physical keyboards, it
is possible to create a unique identity based on keystroke and mouse patterns [29]. Each
principal u in a fingerprinting system is capable of generating a unique fingerprint xt at
some arbitrary time t after registration (hereafter known as operation register). The finger-
print may be any combination of immutable and mutable features which are secret to all
other principals in the system. The principal hereafter owns the identity u and claims this
identity in the future using a generated vector z. Given a deterministic lookup function F ,
the objective of the fingerprinting system is to correctly evaluate the features zt+i claimed
by identity u such that F (zt+i, u) = 1, and F (yt+i, u) = 0 for other possible feature vectors
y that do not belong to u at any arbitrary time step i.
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Authentication through fingerprints is intended to be more convenient than traditional meth-
ods, as the principal does not have to memorize or store any extra burdensome information.
Rather, the principal is only responsible for generating a new sample z upon request by the
authentication system. However, the use of mutable features that act as “fuzzy” indicators
for identity may be prone to misclassification by the authentication system, which can be
considered an estimation over the entire feature space. Due to the nature of these fuzzy
features, many samples may be necessary to make a decision on behalf of the principal,
in which case a majority voting scheme is generally deployed to make the authentication
decision [4]. This abstraction on top of the authentication decision makes the attack more
difficult, since the adversary has less control over the model during queries. Still, in the
worst case, the mutable features could be exploited to fool the estimation of the lookup
function F , which forms the basis for our attack.
Device Fingerprinting. Device fingerprinting, in particular, relies on characteristics in-
herent in any combination of hardware, software, and user behavior of a particular machine.
While different in implementation, it shares some similarities with browser-based fingerprint-
ing, a related line of work that tracks visitors of websites based on browser type/version,
screen resolution, language, fonts, plugins, etc. Device fingerprinting has been explored
extensively in the literature, including by Kohno et al. [24], Bates et al. [4] and Radhakrish-
nan et al. [36]. For example, the solution proposed by Bates et al. relies on the combined
variation of USB firmware and hardware timing to generate a unique signature of the target
host device, while Radhakrishnan et al. use network packet inter-arrival times. Early device
fingerprinting such as the system proposed by Kohno et al. [24] instead relied on system
clock skews. Among these systems, each relied on the intuition that both soft and physical
components of a device contribute a unique amount of variation that enables fingerprinting.
The key to creating a model that captures all different characteristics to a specific signature
was ML classification techniques, such as decision trees in the case of USB transactions,
and artificial feed-forward neural networks for network packets. However, the presence of
an adversary with malicious data samples was only partially investigated in these systems.
Facial Verification. Facial verification, at its core, is also a form of fingerprinting. Each
face can be considered as a set of physical features which contribute a unique amount of
variation that enables fingerprinting. Many approaches have been proposed for facial verifi-
cation, including FaceNet [11], which uses a deep convolutional network trained to directly
learn a mapping from face images to a compact Euclidean space, learning directly from the
face pixels. Other approaches include DeepFace [42], which uses Principal Component Anal-
ysis (PCA) to perform feature reduction, and GaussianFace [26], which jointly learns several
recognition-related tasks to learn better discriminative features. Since a large portion of fa-
cial recognition performance relies on feature engineering, much of the literature focuses on
an efficient feature representation for human faces. However, like device fingerprinting sys-
tems, facial verification systems make extensive use of feature engineering techniques that
make the underlying machine learning models vulnerable to attacks.
2.2 Adversarial Machine Learning (AML)
In our authentication task, the machine learning model assumes the role of lookup table as
described in the previous section. The model is built as a deterministic function F : D → U
mapping a training set of features D to labels U . In our scenario, U forms the labels for all
principals registered with the system, and D is the associated fingerprinting features that F
will use to estimate the distinction between principals, such that x ∈ D for some principal’s
feature vector x. From the view of the machine learning model, the classification and
authentication tasks are identical. In both cases, labels are assigned based on some criterion,
and a decision is made. Many algorithms exist to create the mapping between features and
labels, including Decision Trees, Neural Networks, and Support Vector Machines [46]. We
investigate these models to determine their susceptibility to the attack, both before and
after defenses are applied.
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In an adversarial environment, the model is susceptible to attacks that target different areas
of the decision-making process [3]. Such attacks can be either black-box, grey-box, or white-
box, each denoting a successive increase in the adversary’s knowledge of the underlying
model. Authentication systems are considered oracles that output a binary classification
based on a principal’s inputs. The internal architecture and parameters of the oracle’s
model are not visible to the principals; thus we assume a black-box model throughout our
experiments.
Our attack makes use of transfer learning, in which learned information from one task is
transferred to facilitate learning of a new task (e.g., transferring the weights from a trained
neural network to a new model that will be further fine–tuned). In this way, existing labeled
data of related tasks or domains can be used to train new models. For image classification,
general feature information on image composition is accumulated through a convolutional
neural network’s (CNN’s) layers, where each layer is activating for a certain set of visual
features. A popular technique is to take the final pooling layer of a CNN as a feature
vector, as it produces a concise representation of the accumulated knowledge from every
prior layer [48]. This technique is powerful as vectors can be measured using some arbitrary
distance function. These distances are then used by the model to generate various outputs,
as in the case of natural language processing and face recognition models [39], as well as
any model that attempts classification over a large quantity of classes [25].
2.3 Query Synthesis and XAI
We wish to minimize the amount of queries an adversary makes to the authentication system,
and create queries that will correctly mis-classify the adversary as some identity T . Thus,
we formulate our problem in the context of query synthesis [1]. Query synthesis is a central
problem in the domain of active learning, which is itself a sub-field of machine learning.
The goal of active learning is to learn some concept by using as few queries, or samples, as
possible. Active learning problems can arise in cases where unlabeled data is much more
abundant than labeled data. For our purposes, the adversary must make minimal queries in
order to learn the unknown concept of a potential victim, where the concept describes the
victim’s feature space. Once the adversary learns the concept, they must synthesize queries
that will result in successful authentication.
In an authentication system, an adversary’s only feedback is a positive or negative result.
Since positive results are secret, the adversary must operate on their own data to extract a
victim’s concept. We leverage Explainable–AI (XAI) techniques to infer the decision bound-
ary local to the adversary and determine the set of most influential features in the model,
thus learning a concept that is useful to the adversary. Such techniques (e.g., LIME [37])
were originally developed to present human-readable explanations of opaque model decisions,
but we find they offer an intuitive interface to iteratively discover a decision boundary, and
use such information to synthesize successful queries. Specifically, LIME trains a linear
model using a local neighborhood of perturbations around some data point. Rather than
directly performing iterative perturbations on global features as in previous attacks, we take
this linear model to inform the adversary of which features to modify local to the current
sample in order to move towards a successful query.
3 Approach
Given the earlier discussion, we formally describe our attack algorithm in this section. One
of the challenges is that the internals of the ML model used by the authentication system
are not available to us. For example, if the authentication system uses a DNN that outputs
a class label corresponding to the user-id and then gives its authentication decision (0 or
1), an attacker does not see the attack label (he only observes whether the authentication
request was accepted or denied). We follow the formalization depicted in Figure 2, which
offers a high-level overview of the approach.
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Figure 3: Workflow for building attack samples.To update DA, the adversary applies ground
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3.1 Formalized Threat Model & Attack
Authentication system. Earlier in Section 2.2, the model was defined as the mapping
F : D → U . We extend this definition to consider the dimensionality and possible decisions
of the feature space, to allow for a more rigorous formalization. Let U = {u1, · · · , un} be
the set of current users and F : (U × Dk) → {0, 1} be the classifier that corresponds to
the authentication system (D is the domain of features with dimensionality k). If some
user wants to authenticate as u ∈ U , they present a vector x ∈ Dk, and the authentication
succeeds iff F (u, x) = 1. Formally, an authentication system (AS) is 4-tuple (U,D, k, F ). An
authentication system AS = (U,D, k, F ) also has an operation register, which adds a new
user u′ to AS and thus U is updated to U ∪{u′} and the classifier F is updated accordingly
(i.e., F has to accept inputs of the form (u′, z), where u′ is the new user and z ∈ Dk is
the vector used for authentication). The precise mechanics of the register operation are not
important to the discussion.
Adversary’s capability, constraints and goal. An adversary A is given black-box
access to AS (can register new users and obtain answers to F (u, y) for chosen u and y). The
goal of the adversary is to impersonate some user t ∈ U (i.e., craft a z such that F (t, z) = 1).
There are additional constraints that we can place on the adversary. For example, we can
limit the number of queries and the registration of new users.
Moreover, A can have some partial knowledge about the vector z (e.g., the make and model
of t’s host) that will lead to successful authentication of t. However, we reiterate that
although A may have partial knowledge of z, it is not enough information for successful
impersonation. Thus, in this paper we assume zero knowledge of z. A is permitted to have
knowledge about a subset UA ⊆ U of the users (only in the case that A registered the users
themself or might be colluding with them). For our purposes we further assume that t /∈ UA.
Concrete algorithm of the adversary. Now we describe an algorithm for the adversary.
Note that at each step, the adversary can interact with the authentication system (register-
ing new users or querying F (u, ·) on vectors, which is implicit throughout the algorithm).
Essentially, the adversary is given oracle access to the authentication system.
• Initial: The adversary starts with a substitute network G : Dn → {0, 1} trained on
seed dataset DA ⊆ Dn, where DA is similar to a learnable coreset in the context
of active learning [40]. We set a counter i = 0 and set z0 to be a vector, which
is the initial guess of the attacker. The history H(A) of the adversary is denoted
by (G, z0, · · · , zi) and updates as the algorithm proceeds. In practice, this stage is
implemented as the algorithm described in Algorithm 1, named QuickStart.
• Iterative loop:
– If F (t, zi) = 1, A is done.
– Otherwise A crafts zi+1 based on its history H(A). The adversary updates its
history H(A) by updating G (based on the fact that F (u, zk) = 0 for 0 ≤ k ≤ i)
and increments the counter i. Following the update, the adversary A returns
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to the beginning of the iterative loop and continues the process until a query
is successful.
Now the question is this: how does A craft zi+1 from the current history H(A)? One option
is to use existing algorithms for crafting adversarial examples [35] [34]. However, such
algorithms require explicit information from the oracle about the sample’s classification.
For this reason, we implement our own adversarial sample crafting algorithm, called LIME–
Sampler, which is discussed in detail in the next section. Start with zi and the substitute
network G and craft an example w such that G(w) = 1 and set zi+1 = w. G(w) = 1 implies
that w is crafted so it eventually inhabits the feature space nearby some fingerprint x for
target identity t (with F (t, x) = 1). The algorithms for constructing adversarial examples
can perform better if they rank features that contribute most to the decision. For the
purpose of describing the influence of features on the decision of the substitute model G,
we use techniques from the XAI literature. Specifically, our algorithm leverages an XAI
system, LIME [37] to rank the features that correspond to G’s decision on w.
3.2 Constructing the Seed Dataset
As described in the algorithm above, the adversary must first build a seed dataset DA which
is used to train the substitute model G. There are two challenges in constructing DA. First,
DA should have enough positive and negative examples such that new information is de-
duced, rather than memorized, about the cause for a “Yes” or a “No”. Second, as we alluded
to before, we can only rely on “Yes” and “No” decisions from the authentication system,
rather than class–level information. The idea of discovering the smallest fundamental set
from which to learn a feature space is known as coreset construction in active learning, and
thus we frame our discussion in a similar context [40].
The key factor in an adversary’s ability to infer the decision boundary is the quality of
the adversarial sample crafting algorithm. To illustrate this, we start with a simple case
following the notation of the previous section. Let D be some sample crafting algorithm
which takes as input the adversary’s candidate feature vector, and outputs a highly distorted
version of this vector. For the purpose of discussion, the exact heuristic to measure distortion
is not important, we simply assume that the distortions produced by D mostly result in
outliers within the feature space learned by F . The adversary may construct some feature
vector zi = D(zi−1) for i > 0, forcing F to associate the adversary with the closest principal t
whose feature vector resembles zi = D(zi−1), (that is, F (zi, t) = 1). Inuitively, t is an outlier
who unfortunately is closest in the feature space to the distortions created by D. However,
we assume for any model that the feature space is sufficiently normalized to minimize the
number of outliers. If we limit the adversary’s knowledge to only a subset of usernames
UA ⊂ U , and t /∈ UA, in this case the adversary will not have any chance of success. We
can further deduce that if the amount of outliers in the feature space is minimized, and
the adversary’s knowledge requirement is also minimized, the probability of success quickly
diminishes. In the opposite case, where zi closely resembles the adversary’s own feature
vector, they will always be classified as themselves. It follows that if the adversary crafts
“No” samples, and their distortions are too similar to “Yes” samples, it will be difficult to
model their distinction.
We must thus discover some learnable subspaces for “Yes” and “No” in the total feature
space. This motivates the creation of an iterative sample crafting algorithm, QuickStart,
which can strike a balance between the two extreme cases discussed above. One of the
challenges in designing QuickStart is that we must rely only on the oracle’s authentication
decision to increase or decrease distortion. QuickStart is described in Algorithm 1.
Unlike previous algorithms, QuickStart relies only on a binary decision from the oracle
it is querying. The primary goal is to build a dataset of YES decisions denoted by DAyes
and a dataset of NO decisions denoted by DAno, which combine to form DA. We constrain
the algorithm so that each set is balanced, such that |DAyes | = |DAno | (for the purpose of
better performance when training G later). The attacker starts with a set of benign samples
they own.
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Algorithm 1 QuickStart, seed dataset builder.
Input: AGT , a set of initial samples owned by A. β, exponential distortion lower bound.
α, exponential distortion upper bound. σ, the desired number of samples for each class
(negative and positive), O, the victim Oracle, and subroutine query, a generic interface
available to A for querying O.
DAyes , DAno ← ∅
R← YES
while | DAyes |< σl do
x←R AGT B (random sample from AGT )
R← query(O,A, x)
if R = NO: add(DAno , x)
else : add(DAyes , x)
end while
R← YES, Υ← 0
while | DAno |< σl do
x←R AGT
B (Loop until we meet sufficient distortion)
while R = YES do
increment(Υ)
x∗ ← Perturb(x,Υ)
R← query(O,A, x∗)
end while
x∗ ← Perturb(x,Υ)
R← query(O,A, x∗)
if R = NO: append(DAno , x∗)
end while
return DAno , DAyes
The first loop of the algorithm is responsible for dividing the samples from the set AGT (the
set of initial samples) into the set DAyes.
The second loop performs the process of discovering the set of NO samples (if we had enough
negative samples from the first loop, the second loop does not execute). This loop relies
on a procedure Perturb(x,Υ), which perturbs the vector x according to the parameter Υ
(higher Υ means that the perturbation has higher variance). The lower and upper bounds of
the exponentially increasing distortion form a sliding window that can be easily controlled
by the lower bound β and upper bound α. For example, the adversary may observe their
own features and use a fraction of the lower and upper bounds available. The strength of
the trained model S is ultimately determined by the number of training samples harvested
during QuickStart. Although a larger number of samples is preferable depending on the
architecture of G, a primary goal of A is to also minimize queries; thus, the size of sets
DAyes and DAno is bounded by a tunable parameter σ.
3.3 Crafting Attack Samples
Once A has the dataset DA, it must train a substitute model G as shown in Figure 3.
This step is inspired by black-box attacks which exploit transferability properties of oracle
decision boundaries [34]. Rather than use explicit class labels, we rely on the YES and
NO decisions made by the oracle with respect to perturbed data to create a model of the
decision boundary. The goal of the adversary is to pick a model architecture that does not
require a large DA, but can make a reasonable assumption about future adversarial samples
zi+1. In practice, the primary restriction on the attack’s effectiveness is the selection of G
and size of DA. For example, with a shallow neural network, the accuracy of G ranges from
30%-80% depending on the sample type, size of DA, and quality of samples returned by
QuickStart. Although we optimize our network architecture for test-set performance, the
limited size of DA can limit the effectiveness of A based on its similarity to other principals.
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However, once G is trained, A can easily transform this model into guided perturbations
using an XAI system such as LIME. In 1-dimensional feature modalities, LIME can be used
to describe specific feature values that will contribute to either oracle decision. Specifically,
LIME outputs an interval the feature is expected to occupy for its associated weight on
the decision’s class. Using this information, A crafts attack samples zi+1 and attempts to
masquerade as some other principal in the system. The algorithm to perform this process
is outlined in Algorithm 2.
The main goal is to synthesize a new feature vector x∗ ∈ Rk by modifying the r most
relevant features in x ∈ Rk which contributed to the NO class. It follows that r can
be tuned to adjust the distortion of x∗, such that 0 < r ≤ k for the feature space Dk.
For the sake of the algorithm, we define an explanation returned from LIME–Query as a
vector of 3–tuples containing the index of a feature, the weight of the feature on a NO
decision, and the interval it is expected to occupy. Thus we have an explanation Ex =
{(0, w0, [c0, d0]), ..., (k,wk, [ck, dk])} for feature index i ∈ {0, ..., k}, feature weight wi ∈ R,
interval lower bound ci ∈ R, and its respective upper bound di ∈ R. The top r features
and their intervals are found by simply sorting Ex on the values of wi, and taking the
top r 3–tuples. To arrive at the new value for feature x∗i with i ∈ {0, ..., r}, we sample
uniformly from a feature’s expected interval, such that x∗i ∼ U(ci, di). We further define a
set of principals V for which A knows the usernames, and further assume that v ∈ V with
V ⊂ U . Thus, Algorithm 2 allows us to affect the most relevant features in x that allow A to
masquerade as some other principal, and stop as soon as a successful query is encountered.
Algorithm 2 LIME–Sampler, adversarial sample crafting algorithm.
Input: DA, the seed dataset created with QuickStart, G, an arbitrary model that can be
trained on DA, train, the associated training function for G, LIME–Query, the subroutine
provided by LIME to query given a trained model and candidate sample, and subroutine
query, a generic interface available to A for querying O.
G← train(G, DA)
R← NO
while R =NO do
x←R AGT (random sample from AGT )
B (Get explanation tuples Ex = {(0, w0, [c0, d0]), ..., (k,wk, [ck, dk])} tuples for NO)
Ex ← LIME–Query(x, G, YES)
B (Sort over feature weights wi and take top r tuples)
Ex ← sort(Ex)[: r]
for i, wi, [ci, di] ∈ Ex do
B (Update feature xi with uniform sample over expected interval.)
xi ← U(ci, di)
end for
v ←R V (random sample from V )
B (Now attempt to authenticate as principal v)
R← query(O, v, x)
end while
4 Evaluation
Our attack is targeted against both host and biometric authentication systems. Our exper-
iments are motivated by the following questions:
1. Are classification models suitable for use in authentication systems, even with a
relatively low number of principals and private data?
2. Are perturbations during the attack, and their effects, understandable by humans?
3. Do defenses such as adversarial sample injection afford classification models robust-
ness against masquerade attacks?
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We answer these questions by attacking models and data that have been vetted by the
research community. For clarity, we describe the implementation, mechanisms, and data
used for each target system.
4.1 Experimental Highlights
From our experiments, we observe that the attack is effective across the tested domains and
machine learning classifiers. In particular:
1. We find that classification models, even when defended, are vulnerable to our attack,
giving the adversary up to 93% success rate depending on the model architecture.
The attack is equally effective against a commercial facial recognition system.
2. Perturbations can be understood by the adversary in both domains. For host au-
thentication, the adversary simply notes the USB enumeration timings which pro-
duced success. In biometric authentication, the adversary can use LIME’s graphical
plotting capabilities to reveal portions of the image that contributed to successful
masquerade.
3. Adversarial training is effective for certain models, and greatly reduces the adver-
sary’s probability for success. However, future adversarial inputs could be easily
modified to evade such training.
4.2 Data and Implementations
Host authentication. We evaluate against a host authentication system based on USB
enumeration timings of a computer under test [4]. This system uses a Random Forest as the
underlying machine learning model, trained in a target vs. outlier fashion, with a new model
created for every principal registered to the system. Outlier classes are balanced with respect
to every possible principal in the system. Over-sampling is performed with replacement until
the number of target samples matches the number of outlier samples. In this way, there
are equal numbers of class data samples registered in the machine learning model. The
implementation and data was obtained from the authors of the original system [4]. The
trace data for this system consists of identical machines across nine users. This data also
had scripts to generate the accompanying datasets for each principal’s model. As described
in [4], certain hosts must be filtered from the dataset to remove false positives. We note
that two of the nine hosts were removed from the set of principals after applying this
constraint. Due to the limited sample size of this dataset, we focus much of our experiments
on biometric authentication. Nevertheless, we believe this system’s scope is realistic, and
helps us generalize the attack to similar host authentication schemes [24, 36].
Biometric authentication. We target a facial authentication system based on a state-
of-the-art facial recognition model named Facenet [39]. The implementation is taken from a
popular open-source repository on GitHub [11]. We use only pre-trained models provided by
the repository’s maintainer. The Facenet embedding model was trained on a subset of the
Microsoft Celeb-1M image dataset [20], which was released for the MSR Image Recognition
Challenge at ACM Multimedia 2016. Since Facenet may act as an embedding model under-
neath an authentication model, we train a Support Vector Machine classifier as described
by the repository’s documentation to perform authentication (denoted Facenet-SVM). For
completeness, we also measure the attack against two additional models: Random Forest
(Facenet-RF) and Neural Network (Facenet-NN), to understand the attack’s scope in sys-
tems which have different architectures. These models were selected as they demonstrated
the best classification accuracy when combined with Facenet. After training, none of the
authentication systems exhibited false positives on hold-out evaluation data.
Training and evaluation data is taken from the Georgia Tech Face Database [31] and contains
faces of 50 people, with 15 images per person. The provided faces are composed of frontal
shots that vary in facial expressions and lighting conditions, which we deem realistic for
a real-world face authentication system. For consistency, this image data is pre-processed
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with Multi-task CNN [49], the same face alignment model used to pre-process all Facenet-
related training data. We make no other assumptions about the model, and argue that the
adversary would be free to use any face-cropping tool available to have consistency in their
attack.
Due to the large feature space of face images, we propose two different paradigms for per-
turbing attack images, which are demonstrated in Figure 1:
1. Random Pixel. This attack implements Perturb from Figure 1 as the adversary
setting a subset of pixels to random subpixel values according to Υ, inspired by
recent state-of-the-art attacks [34, 35]. In this attack, the entire image constitutes
a single sample fed into G.
2. VAE Latent Space. This attack makes use of the Facenet Variational Autoen-
coder (VAE) to create natural and realistic attack images. Similar to hill-climbing
attacks which target feature dimensionality reduction [15, 16], the adversary imple-
ments Perturb to modify the low-dimensional latent vector created after encoding
their face with the VAE, similar to a natural image attack proposed by Zhao et
al. [50]. This means the adversary is able to create natural and believable face sam-
ples with feature distortion Υ. Perturbed latent vectors are used as training data
for G, and are decoded to query the authentication system.
Thus, we offer two different techniques for perturbing adversary data before feeding it into
LIME. We take the GitHub repository’s version of the Facenet VAE along with the provided
weights trained on the CASIA-WebFace dataset [47], a large-scale dataset containing almost
500k faces of over 10k people. We clarify that every pre-trained model used in the experi-
ments was trained on a different and unique dataset. That is, we assume the adversary has
no access to the oracle’s training data, other than what the adversary has registered.
The use of a Facenet-derived generative model may partially violate the black-box assump-
tion. To verify our attack, we run experiments against a face recognition API named
Face++ [13]. To clarify, Face++ does not have any relation to Facenet, apart from their
similar naming. We build a small oracle abstraction around the Face++ API to return only
a YES or NO to the adversary. A configurable parameter of Face++ is the threshold at
which it returns a positive result. If the provided face aligns with an identity in the top k
matched identities, it will return a YES. Unlike previous work [41], we configure the Face++
API’s top-k response to k = 1 and only count a query as successful if the top result returned
by Face++ matches the identity claimed by the adversary. We believe this scenario is the
most realistic, as it targets the most secure setting of k possible within the system, and is
simultaneously the worst-case scenario for the adversary.
4.3 Metrics
We define a successful attack as one in which the adversary is able to masquerade as some
other principal on the system, that is, reach masquerade, and denote probability of masquer-
ade as P (M). A principal’s login credentials can be interpreted as some pairing of username
u and a unique secret token d initially known only by the owner of u. It follows that if u is
known, an adversary may attempt to generate d for an observable feature space Dk where
d ∈ Dk, defined prior in Section 3.1. As the adversary’s knowledge of the usernames in the
population U increases, so does success probability P (M). Let V denote the set of known
usernames (not secret tokens) by the adversary, such that V ⊂ U . With complete knowl-
edge of all usernames (V = U), the adversary has success probability P (M) = 1, assuming
the adversary has infinite queries available and may try every combination of features avail-
able. It follows that for V = ∅, P (M) = 0. Due to practical computation restrictions,
this assumption is not very useful for the adversary. However, we show that P (M) may be
maximized as long as V 6= ∅.
With some arbitrary amount of knowledge of the system’s registered usernames, V , and
a realistic bound on feature combinations, the adversary desires to increase probability
P (M) and minimize ||V ||. The most straightforward way to accomplish this is to artificially
increase the distribution of false positives in the system, such that P (FPO) >> P (FPR) for
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Figure 4: Attack coverage map based on authentication success for adversary–victim pairs.
An adversary knows all seven usernames in the system during the attack.
Replay 57.25 ± 65.99
P (M) = 71%
QuickStart 112.25 ± 41.67
P (M) = 71%
QuickStart 133.25 ± 34.64
+LIME P (M) = 57%
Table 1: The average number of adversarial queries before success in each of three ex-
periments, testing against USB enumeration at 100% knowledge. P (M) is the calculated
probability based on attack coverage for each experiment.
the optimized approach O, and random approach R. XAI systems such as LIME enhance the
adversary’s knowledge of the oracle’s decision boundary, allowing the adversary to increase
P (M), thus minimizing the number of queries needed to find a false positive. Thus, for every
experiment we measure the number of queries at which the adversary achieves masquerade,
and the adversary’s authentication decision for every victim u ∈ U . P (M) is calculated as
the number of principals who could achieve masquerade, divided by the total number of
principals in the experiment. Thus, if there is a set of principals in the experiment U , and
the set of principals who achieved masquerade UM , we have UM ⊆ U and P (M)AS = ||UM ||||U ||
for an authentication system AS.
4.4 Experiments
We run experiments to measure the success rate and number of queries for different versions
of the approach across different domains. Each experiment measures the authentication
system’s decision and number of queries from the scope of both adversary and the principal
(i.e., the victim):
1. Baseline. The baseline experiment establishes metrics when the adversary uses their
own unmodified data against the victims.
2. Naive Replay (host authentication). The adversary exploits assumptions that
host authentication systems make about variance in the principal’s authentication
stream [4, 9, 36]. The adversary replays one sample of their own data enough
times to form the authentication stream, and forms the most effective, yet naive
comparison to our attacks.
3. Naive Random (biometric authentication). The adversary samples x ∼ N (µ, σ2)
for every feature x ∈ X in the attack sample. This experiment is the same in both
Random Image and VAE Latent Space attacks, such that a potential adversary
naively samples random subpixels to create an image.
4. QuickStart. The QuickStart experiment measures the metrics in Section 4.3, P (M)
and number of queries, when only the QuickStart algorithm is used.
5. QuickStart+LIME. The QuickStart+LIME experiment measures the same metrics
as the QuickStart experiment but when QuickStart is combined with the LIME
XAI system to enhance perturbations.
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Figure 5: Comparison of distributions for a victim’s real USB enumeration vector, and a
faked USB enumeration vector created by the adversary.
4.5 Host Authentication
In Figure 4, the authentication success of each adversary and victim pair is displayed for
each experiment. The baseline displays an expected matrix for a proper authentication
system, with no false positives and no false negatives. The replay experiment shows the
effect of an adversary performing the naive replay attack described in Section 4.2, such that
an adversary simply replays one of their samples until they form a valid input stream. We
note that in this attack, a potential adversary has P (M) = 100%, but the attack holds little
utility because they are still identifiable by the sample passed to the system. The oracle
could also easily enforce a minimum level of variance across incoming input streams before
performing authentication. Thus, this type of attack is easily mitigated.
With the QuickStart attack, adversaries yield successful YES queries and are no longer
identified as themselves. Several instances of previously unsuccessful adversary-victim pairs
now yield a positive result in favor of the adversary. In total, five of the seven principals
in the system were vulnerable to potential adversaries, with one adversary gaining access
to two separate identities. The QuickStart+LIME attack yields a lower success rate than
QuickStart alone, as shown in Table 1. The number of queries for each are within standard
deviation of each other (112.25 ± 41.67 and 133.25 ± 34.64, respectively). We believe the
limited feature space of this dataset are limiting factors for LIME’s effectiveness.
To further investigate why the QuickStart attack is effective, a victim’s real trace and a
successful imposter trace are plotted in Figure 5 to examine their difference in feature
distribution. The distribution is binned such that each bin corresponds to the nearest time of
an enumeration feature, in milliseconds. Previous work tested robustness of authentication
systems by attempting to replay samples with specific feature distributions that mimicked
the target [36]. However, Figure 5 reveals that an exact replica of the feature distribution is
not needed. The imposter sample has a larger frequency of enumeration timings in the zero
millisecond and two millisecond bins, and was still misclassified as the victim. The attacker
must simply exploit one blind spot in the decision boundary to launch an attack.
4.6 Biometric Authentication
The performance of the attack varies widely when targeted against Facenet-based classifiers.
We first examine each model separately without defenses (row one of each coverage map in
Figures 6, 7, and 8, respectively). For all experiments, we take the adversary’s knowledge as
30% of the total registered usernames in the system for ease of presentation (thus ||U || = 50
and ||V || = 15 for an attack against the entire Georgia Tech Face Database [31]). We ex-
perimentally observed the same general trends for our attack at lower and higher knowledge
levels, and leave the optimization of knowledge level for future work. As discussed in Sec-
tion 4.3, P (M) is tied to the size of adversary’s knowledge set V . Intuitively, the attacker
desires the highest possible coverage of false positives across principals, as this maximizes
P (M) when a smaller knowledge set V is taken. For example, if an attack yields only a
single false positive for some set U ′ of identities, and the adversary takes a smaller subset
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Figure 6: Coverage maps for the Facenet-SVM classifier. Cells denote authentication success
for each adversary–victim pair. Lighter cells denote unsuccessful queries shaded by the
model’s confidence, when available.
U ′′ ⊂ U ′, such that ||U ′′|| << ||U ′||, it is unlikely that the subset will yield a successful
attack.
4.6.1 Support Vector Machine (Facenet-SVM)
The attack coverage is shown in Figure 6 for the random pixel and VAE attacks. The
baseline map for both versions exhibits the expected classifications for an authentication
system, confirming the model’s accuracy at test time. The model begins to misclassify
when random inputs are used, yielding a high success rate, as observed in Table 2. However,
upon closer inspection of Figure 6, every adversary is misclassified as the same victim. In
this case, the distribution of false positives is not consistent and gives a low chance for a
successful attack if a new subset of victims was chosen. Although calculated P (M) = 87%
for QuickStart is lower, false positives are more evenly distributed in the system. This
distribution further increases when LIME is used, yielding both high attack coverage and
high P (M) of 80%. The VAE latent space attack is very effective and improves upon the
random pixel attack. In the VAE attack, QuickStart and QuickStart+LIME perform at the
same P (M) of 87%.
4.6.2 Random Forest (Facenet-RF)
The attack coverage against the RF classifier is shown in Figure 7, and exhibits a higher
vulnerability in general than SVM. The random attack exhibits the same behavior where
adversaries are often classified as the same victim. QuickStart dramatically improves the
attack coverage in both the Random Pixel and VAE attacks, with up to 100% success rate
as seen in Table 2. Perceptually, QuickStart+LIME has higher coverage for the random
pixel attack than for the VAE attack.
4.6.3 Neural Network (Facenet-NN)
As before, the attack is successful against the NN classifier, as shown in Figure 8. Although
the random attack yields high success rate, victims are focused on a single identity. The
QuickStart attack improves the coverage in both Random Pixel and VAE attacks, yielding
P (M) of up 87% in both attack types according to Table 2. The VAE Latent Space does
not benefit from LIME as much as the Random Pixel attack, where P (M) increases by 27%
with LIME.
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Figure 7: Coverage maps for the Facenet-RF classifier. Cells denote authentication success
for each adversary–victim pair. Lighter cells denote unsuccessful queries shaded by the
model’s confidence, when available.
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Figure 8: Coverage maps for the Facenet-NN classifier. Cells denote authentication success
for each adversary–victim pair. Lighter cells denote unsuccessful queries shaded by the
model’s confidence, when available.
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Random Pixel Image Perturb. Attack
SVM No Defense Random Defense All Defense
Random 22 ± 13.68 — —
P (M) = 87%
QuickStart 129.5 ± 38.56 131 ± 0 —
P (M) = 40% P (M) = 7%
QuickStart 114.67 ± 25.99 124.75 ± 25.91 152 ± 0
+LIME P (M) = 80% P (M) = 27% P (M) = 7%
RF No Defense Random Defense All Defense
Random 94 ± 64.82 — —
P (M) = 73%
QuickStart 152.47 ± 84.10 162.33 ± 67.12 107.5 ± 18.27
P (M) = 100% P (M) = 100% P (M) = 93%
QuickStart 120.67 ± 80.49 118.53 ± 26.26 123.71 ± 24.58
+LIME P (M) = 100% P (M) = 100% P (M) = 93%
NN No Defense Random Defense All Defense
Random 13.21 ± 7.16 — —
P (M) = 93%
QuickStart 140 ± 45.56 136.4 ± 53.47 164.75 ± 67.33
P (M) = 60% P (M) = 67% P (M) = 27%
QuickStart 130.23 ± 44.38 160.73 ± 63.02 142.89 ± 63.58
+LIME P (M) = 87% P (M) = 73% P (M) = 60%
VAE Latent Space Perturb. Attack
No Defense Random Defense All Defense
31.21 ± 16.42 — —
P (M) = 93%
102.62 ± 23.56 90.46 ± 12.35 113.6 ± 13.88
P (M) = 87% P (M) = 87% P (M) = 33%
100.54 ± 25.66 104.69 ± 22.03 124 ± 19.03
P (M) = 87% P (M) = 87% P (M) = 20%
No Defense Random Defense All Defense
84.11 ± 66.32 — —
P (M) = 60%
125.23 ± 38.94 112.58 ± 50.37 102.43 ± 23.63
P (M) = 87% P (M) = 80% P (M) = 93%
132.43 ± 35.04 99 ± 21.51 112.29 ± 39.27
P (M) = 93% P (M) = 80% P (M) = 93%
No Defense Random Defense All Defense
11.21 ± 0.41 — —
P (M) = 93%
104.08 ± 25.69 127 ± 50.71 155.88 ± 46.10
P (M) = 87% P (M) = 87% P (M) = 53%
108.23 ± 23.18 118.69 ± 29.27 144.43 ± 58.78
P (M) = 87% P (M) = 87% P (M) = 93%
Table 2: The average number of adversarial queries before success in each of three experi-
ments, against each of the Facenet-SVM, Facenet-RF, and Facenet-NN classifiers and with
varying level of defenses at 30% knowledge. P (M) is the calculated probability based on
attack coverage for each experiment. Dashes indicate no successful attacks, with P (M) = 0.
4.7 Defenses
We consider our attack against biometric authentication when defenses derived from the lit-
erature [34] are added to the oracle. The selection of defenses is not meant to be exhaustive,
but rather examine whether our attack can be mitigated by model-agnostic implementations.
4.7.1 Injecting Random Noise (Random Defense)
Rather than initializing the oracle on the normal training data, we also inject a new class
named other to the training set, which consists of images with randomly generated pixel
values. The number of images in this class is chosen to match the maximum number of
training set images for each principal in the dataset. Thus, when an adversary attempts
to launch an attack using such images, they are identified as other and a NO is returned.
This defense corresponds to the second row of each coverage map in Figures 6, 7, and 8.
The defense completely blocks the naive random attack for every model tested, while also
slightly mitigating the effectiveness of the Random Pixel attack. In this scenario, the benefit
of LIME is most clear as it offers the best coverage against an oracle with this defense. Since
this defense does not target adversarial images from a generative model, it is not effective
at blocking the VAE Latent Space attack.
4.7.2 Injecting Random Noise + Fakes (All Defenses)
In addition to training on noisy data, the oracle is also given a class named fake that consists
of adversarial samples created by a generative algorithm. This defense must be implemented
carefully, as the oracle should still be robust enough to properly classify principals that are
partially occluded or blurry. Thus, we devise a defense that will demonstrate whether
QuickStart and QuickStart+LIME are producing useful, non-random perturbations to the
latent space. The defense is initialized by first using the Facenet-VAE model to encode one
of every principal’s images into the latent space. We note that in this scenario, the oracle
has the advantage of owning the generative model used by the adversary. If this were not
true, the defense would still be valid, so long as the chosen generative model can create fake,
yet realistic images of the principals. The oracle takes the maximum and minimum values
of the selection’s encodings to create a lower and upper bound of latent variables for each
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principal. These bounds are used to randomly sample new latent space vectors, which are
decoded to form an adversarial example. Thus, we will observe if perturbations induced by
QuickStart and QuickStart+LIME are either meaningful deductions from the adversary’s
original data, or simply random samples in the latent space. This defense corresponds to
the third row of each coverage map in Figures 6, 7, 8. QuickStart and QuickStart+LIME
circumvent defenses for all models, and reduce the adversary’s P (M) by up to 67% in
the case of the SVM classifier, which saw a performance drop once LIME was introduced.
Overall, LIME tends to improve the attacker’s odds when the feature space is larger. This
is expected as LIME is largely data-driven in its implementation, and suffers when a smaller
amount of information is available to derive the decision boundary.
4.8 Black-box Attack (Face++ API)
In general, our results suggest that QuickStart is able to circumvent defenses which inject
adversarial training data into the oracle. In terms of query count, QuickStart and Quick-
Start+LIME are within standard deviation of each other. As such, the main benefit of using
LIME is a better attack surface, depending on what classification model the oracle uses. We
believe the QuickStart+LIME in the VAE Latent Space configuration gives an adversary
the highest chance of launching an attack, as in the worst case it will perform slightly worse
if the oracle uses an SVM classifier, but better if the model is Random Forest or Neural
Network.
To verify our results, we target the Face++ face recognition API as described in Section 4.2,
providing it the entire Georgia Tech Face Database [31] as training data (as such, ||U || = 50).
We use the VAE Latent Space attack with both QuickStart and QuickStart+LIME, to
compare their effectiveness on a black-box oracle, assuming the same adversary knowledge
of ||V || = 15 from previous experiments. The coverage map for this experiment is shown
in Figure 9, and queries from each experiment in Table 3. We note that the naive random
attack is not successful, suggesting that Face++ protects against images with randomly
generated pixels. The QuickStart and QuickStart+LIME attacks are both successful, with
QuickStart+LIME yielding better attack coverage than QuickStart alone, which mimics the
earlier experiments against Facenet-NN.
5 Discussion
A unique benefit of using an XAI technique to produce perturbations is the ability to
“interrogate” the substitute model G. By examining the explanations returned by LIME
during the adversarial sample crafting process, we can form some intuition of why the attack
is successful.
5.1 Explaining Attacks
Figure 10 illustrates an explanation of the top scoring rules in the latent variable encoding
L for a successful attack image. We examine if LIME was accurate by perturbing one of the
top scoring weights. The top scoring rule, L49 <= −8.16, is the rule LIME believes to have
the highest weight against the adversary. In order to force a change with only one variable,
a large distortion is induced. When the variable is changed from L49 = 2 to L49 = −70,
the oracle’s decision changes from YES to NO. The new face is perceptually altered, most
notably in terms of skin tone and mouth structure. This gives the adversary some insight
into how the oracle is making decisions, which is a natural consequence of leveraging XAI
techniques.
5.2 Defending with XAI
As noted previously, XAI can be used by the adversary to learn how the oracle makes
decisions. However, the oracle is not restricted from using XAI on itself. The oracle may
use XAI to examine which features contribute to misclassification, and determine if decisions
are being made due to memorization of certain features, or by correctly extrapolating from
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Figure 9: Coverage heatmaps for the Face++ Black-box experiment. Cells denote authen-
tication success for each adversary–victim pair.
Random —
QuickStart 163.88 ± 48.35
P (M) = 53%
QuickStart 155.11 ± 39.63
+LIME P (M) = 60%
Table 3: The average number of adversarial queries before success in each of three experi-
ments, testing against Face++ API at 30% knowledge. P (M) is the calculated probability
based on attack coverage for each experiment. Dashes indicate no successful attacks, with
P (M) = 0.
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Figure 10: An explanation of potential latent variables Li. Rules in green denote rules
towards the adversary, while rules in red denote rules away from the adversary. The most
weighted latent variable, L49, is shifted to illustrate the effect on adversary’s success.
the training data. Note however that the adversary can do the same as soon as it obtains
a YES result. For example, the adversary is free to perform the previous experiment, and
observe the effect of specific latent variables. Thus, we argue that the oracle can only win
if it can generate explanations that are stronger than those deduced by the adversary. This
is not unreasonable, as the oracle has white-box access to itself. XAI systems, such as
LIME [37], rely on iterative perturbations to discover the decision boundary. It follows
that with strong explanations, an oracle can correctly infer the perturbations acting against
it, and take action as needed. Future work is necessary in order to better understand the
efficacy of this approach when applied as a defensive measure.
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5.3 Limitations
The primary limitation in our attack is the restricted amount of data available for G to learn
the oracle’s decision boundary. We observe this effect in LIME’s performance as the feature
space becomes smaller. Notably, the QuickStart+LIME attack is most effective for the
Random Pixel perturbation technique, which uses the entire image as input to G. When
training on perturbed VAE latent vectors, which are an order of magnitude smaller, the
utility of LIME diminishes. Implementing data augmentation techniques into the system is
an immediate improvement for future work, as it allows the adversary to further reduce the
number of necessary queries.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to attempt circumvention of an authentication
system while assuming a blind adversary. However, due to the assumption that victim data
is secret, it is not possible to target specific principals in the system. Although this is a fair
assumption to make in the context of real-world authentication systems, it slightly reduces
the attack’s utility. However, we believe the ability to mask an adversary’s malicious acts
is still useful and poses a risk to any infrastructures that attempt to mediate interactions
between users.
6 Related Work
Radhakrishnan et al. [36] investigated the ability of an attacker to mimic fingerprints, but
they did not consider advanced attacks that would infer the classifier’s decision boundary.
Such attacks were initially outlined by Barreno et al. [2, 3] and Biggio [5] in terms of an
adversary’s knowledge, intended influence, time horizon, and the type of security violation.
For example, some attacks might aim to make the classifier mis-classify all future inputs,
resulting in denial of service. Another attack could attempt to make gradual changes over
a long period of time, successively poisoning each re-training attempt. If the fingerprinting
model is rendered unusable, it must be taken offline, nullifying any security benefits it would
otherwise offer. In this paper, we focus on only inferring the decision boundary at test-time,
rather than trying to change it at train-time.
Machine learning classifiers designed to defend against adversaries, a technique known as ad-
versarial machine learning, must consider attackers with varying knowledge of the classifier.
Huang et al. [22] expanded on the prior work by considering particular domain applications
of adversarial machine learning in both e-mail spam detection [32] and anomalous network
traffic detection [38]. Attacks in these domains had to take advantage of differences in data
distribution, the adversary’s control over specific features, and any assumptions the learn-
ing algorithm made about the adversary. This prior work helps lay the framework for an
improved fingerprinting model that may encounter adversarial inputs.
Bates et al. [4] and Radhakrishnan et al. [36] explored several possible classifiers in their
fingerprinting systems. Adversarial versions for some of these have been proposed, such as
work by Dalvi [10] in the form of an adversary-aware Naive Bayes classifier. This technique
incorporated the cost of new training samples with respect to how much it affected the
decision boundary. In the realm of worm software detection, Newsome et al. [33] proposed
defenses against the Red Herring attack, where unnecessary “chaff” features are used to
mislead the worm classifier. Zhou et al. [51] proposed AD-SVM, an adversary-aware support
vector machine (SVM), which is built against attacks that target either all possible feature
modifications, or only certain data points. Although Zhou et al. show that this proposed
SVM classifier is more robust, classification performance degrades when the adversary’s
attacks are weak. We build our own versions of these defenses to investigate their utility
against a blind attacker, and compare their accuracy. Papernot et al. [34] use previously
defined adversarial sample crafting algorithms [17, 35] to create an attack model capable
of making deep neural network (DNN) oracles mis-classify the majority of image inputs.
Unlike previous work by Barreno et al. [3], the target classifier is treated as a black-box
model, with the only feedback being classified image labels. When an oracle also gives
confidence values, Trame`r et al. [44] show it is possible to replicate an oracle’s decision tree
with near-perfect accuracy. These two latter works are of key interest, as they target the
final classifier techniques chosen by Bates et al. and Radhakrishnan et al., particularly the
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decision tree algorithm and neural networks. Although these previous attacks are useful
against classification models in general, they rely on class label feedback from the model.
For an authentication system, we must assume only a binary classification result, such that
positive target results are secret. Regardless, we take inspiration from these previous works
to build our own adversarial sample crafting algorithm.
Modern face detection is built atop the foundational object detection framework by Viola
and Jones, which uses an “integral image” representation to quickly evaluate facial fea-
tures [45]. Face detection supports a number of applications, including face alignment,
clustering, recognition, and verification. Specifically, we focus on facial verification systems.
Like fingerprinting systems, facial verification is vulnerable to targeted attacks by an ad-
versary. Fredrikson et al. [14] showed that images can be recovered from API access to
facial recognition services, using only the model’s output. By contrast, the adversary in our
setting perturbs its inputs without recovering the face of target principals. In a hill-climbing
attack [15, 16], synthetic templates are iteratively modified based on similarity score until
reaching the verification threshold, whereas our approach does not directly iterate on feed-
back in this way. Goswami et al. [18] break verification models using grid-based occlusion
and face-level distortions, while Papernot et al. [34] show that randomly perturbing even a
few pixels can cause misclassification. The work by Goswami et al. is the most similar to
ours, as they introduce distortions or occlusions into face images to induce a misclassifica-
tion. However, Goswami et al. do not consider a constrained adversary who is limited in
queries. In such a case, the adversary can not only induce image processing distortions, but
also construct entirely new faces using generative machine learning models, which we show
is more effective (and realistic) than standard image processing distortions.
Early XAI techniques sought to determine why opaque neural networks made decisions by
investigating their parameters and extracting rules. Towell and Shavlik [43] extracted rules
from neural networks with performance that closely resembled that of the original model.
Later, Breiman [8] explained random forests by randomly selecting features and finding those
with the highest influence, while Martens et al. [27] followed a similar approach to Towell
and Shavlik, extracting rules from SVMs. These techniques eventually evolved to display
more meaningful interpretations. Although Mozina et al. [30] focused on the set of the
most influential features in the model, they displayed them graphically using a nomogram,
along with a visualization of the confidence intervals. Modern XAI techniques, such as
LIME [37], extend this graphical approach with the use of iterative perturbations in the
style of adversarial sample crafting algorithms [17, 35] to create human readable, globally
interpretable decision explanations. We parse these explanations to learn a concept of a
potential victim’s feature space. Not only are perturbations effective, they also give some
insight into potentially vulnerable features.
To date, there has been very little investigation of XAI techniques to address security
applications. The only work we are aware of in this vein is very recent work by Guo et
al. [19], who consider explainable techniques for deep learning-based security applications.
These types of applications, which make substantial use of RNNs, present challenges that
are considerably different from authentication; they are focused on long sequences, where
the sequentially-oriented nature of RNNs are advantageous. By contrast, authentication is
a binary decision and lends itself well to XAI approaches such as LIME.
7 Conclusion
Model-based authentication schemes are powerful methods for establishing identity in en-
vironments requiring some form of resource mediation. However, these schemes can be
broken if the adversary is able to sufficiently query the oracle and learn the distinction
between themselves and the other principals in the system. This paper explores the effec-
tiveness of such an approach, and shows that feature distribution is not necessarily tied
to an attacker’s success. We also show that XAI is an intuitive and effective technique by
which adversaries can infer decision boundaries from a victim model.
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